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CAPITAL FINANCING FOR HOSPITALS: THE
NEW YORK EXPERIENCE
JOANNE K. HILFERTYt
The state and federal governments have become increasingly con-
cerned with the rapid escalation of hospital capital expenditures be-
cause of the implications of such expenditures for the type of health
services provided, the number of hospital beds available and the costs
of operating hospitals.' The Congressional Budget Office estimated
that hospital capital expenditures increased by an average of 15.5 per-
cent per annum between 1970 and 1975 and projected that the expendi-
tures, if unchecked, would reach $8.0 billion in 1978 and $14.4 billion
in 1982.2 During the period from 1970 to 1975, the number of hospital
beds increased by an average of 2.3 percent per annum resulting in an
increase of almost 100,000 beds and driving the number of hospital
beds from 4.2 per 1,000 population to 4.5 per 1,000.1 This accounted
for a portion of the increase in capital expenditures; inflation and in-
creased assets per bed accounted for the remainder.
Nevertheless, the state and federal governments have been actively
involved in promoting capital expenditures through a variety of mecha-
nisms, including the federal Hill-Burton Program, federal hospital
mortgage insurance, cost-based reimbursement covering both deprecia-
tion and interest under Medicare and Medicaid, and tax-exempt bond
financing by state and local governments or entities authorized by those
governments. Moreover, the state and federal governments have man-
dated extensive capital construction by increasing the stringency of life-
t Director, Hospital and Nursing Home Program, New York State Housing Finance
Agency and Medical Care Facilities Finance Agency. A.B. 1972, Brown University; M.P.A. 1975,
Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. The views expressed in this article are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies or opinions of the New York State Housing
Finance Agency or the Medical Care Facilities Finance Agency.
1. See, eg., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONTROLLING
THE SUPPLY OF HOSPITAL BEDS (1976); W. MCCLURE, REDUCING ExcEss HOSPITAL CAPACITY
(1976); Inglehart, A FieldDayfor Goldilocks, 26 NAT'L J. 1060 (1978); Inglehart, Capital Deforma-
tion, 40 NAT'L J. 1699 (1977); Inglehart, Stemming Hospital Growth-The Fl Side of Carter's Cost
Control Plan, 23 NAT'L J. 848 (1977).
2. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 95th CONG., 1st SEss., HOSPITAL COST CONTAIN-
MENT ACT OF 1977: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL 13 (Comm. Print 1977).
3. Somers & Somers, A Proposed Framework/or Health andtHealth Policy, 14 INQUIRY 131,
135 (1977).
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safety codes and other structural requirements.4
Proposals for containing the escalation of hospital capital expendi-
tures have ranged from a nationwide cap on annual capital expendi-
tures, 5 to a moratorium on all hospital capital expenditures,6 to
restrictions on tax-exempt financing for hospitals.7 Barring an outright
moratorium, federal and state governments must more effectively inte-
grate their financing, planning and cost containment strategies by
targeting capital construction toward needed services and underserved
areas and by assuring that projects undertaken are cost effective.
In order to explore more fully the public policy implications of
hospital financing, this article reviews the government financing mech-
anisms available nationwide and then focuses on the experience in the
State of New York. New York provides an interesting case study for
two reasons. First, government financing programs for promoting hos-
pital construction and renovation have been used extensively. Second,
state officials have closely scrutinized and reevaluated the appropriate
role of tax-exempt financing-for housing, mental health, colleges, uni-
versities, nursing homes and hospitals-as a result of the serious diffi-
culties the state encountered in the financial markets in 1975 and 1976.
The New York experience thus provides useful insights for other states
confronting financial constraints.
I. THE ExISTING NATIONWIDE FINANCING MECHANISMS
The two major government financing programs active today-fed-
eral insurance on hospital mortgages and tax-exempt bonds issued by
4. The increasingly restrictive conditions of participation for the Medicare program are one
example. See also Wing & Silton, ConstitulionalAuthorilyfor Extending Federal Control Over the
Delivery of Health Care, this Symposium.
5. This approach was incorporated in Title II of the Carter Administration's proposed Hos-
pital Cost Containment Act of 1977, S. 1391, H.R. 6575, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
6. See, e.g., V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? 104 (1974).
7. Representative Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, Subcommittee on Health, Committee on
Ways and Means, United States House of Representatives, stated:
[A]t a time when virtually all health economists believe that there must be more restraint
exercised in the development of new facilities, tax-exempt financing authorized through
Section 103 of the tax code has become the largest hospital construction program in this
country.
* . . The very existence of easily accessible, no-risk, tax-exempt bonds is an induce-
ment to build. Should not the government reevaluate its tax policy which has become
the fiscal basis for much new construction in the hospital industry?
Health Priorities: Where Should the Nation Be Going?, A National Journal Conference Proceed-
ings: The Carter Administration, Congress and Health Policy, Washington, D.C., (May 22-23,
1978).
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state and local governmental entities-both involve debt financing 8 se-
cured by a mortgage or a lease. This use of debt is indicative of the
trend in hospital financing over the last decade away from philan-
thropy and government grants.9 Indeed, it is now the fastest growing
source of hospital capital funds. Although estimates vary, its rapid rise
is extensively documented. The American Hospital Association calcu-
lates that debt financing's relative position as a source of capital funds
for hospitals has increased from 39.5 percent for projects completed in
1968 to 67.9 percent for projects begun in 1976.10 These figures include
both government-related and private lending sources.
Federal and state governments have assisted and reinforced the
trend toward debt financing in two ways. First, Medicare and Medi-
caid-major sources of revenue for hospitals-have reimbursed hospi-
tals for interest and other capital costs."I Second, the federal and state
governments have actually provided sources of debt financing. Hospi-
tal construction financed through federal insurance programs or tax-
exempt bond proceeds increased from a negligible share of total fund-
ing in the late 1960s to 15.2 percent of total hospital construction for
insured mortgages and 34.6 percent for tax-exempt bond proceeds in
1976.12
8. The federal Hill-Burton program no longer receives appropriations and has been effec-
tively replaced by the resource development program authorized under the National Health Plan-
ning and Resources Development Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. § 3001(1976); see Wing & Craige, Healh
Care Regulation: Dilemma of a Partially Developed Public Policy, this Symposium, at text accom-
panying notes 184-85.
9. Irwin Wolkstein has identified three stages in the history of hospital capital financing.
Originally, philanthropy was the primary provider of capital funds. Next, after a hiatus in hospi-
tal construction during the Great Depression and World War II, government grants-in-aid played
the predominant role. Finally, since the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid in the late
1960's, internally generated funds-primarily from third-party payors-have become the major
source by enabling hospitals to accumulate reserves and/or support debt service requirements.
Wolkstein, The Impact of Legislation on Capital Development for Health Facilities, in G. MAC-
LEOD & M. PERLMAN, HEALTH CARE CAPITAL: COMPETITION AND CONTROL 7 (1976).
10. Lightle, '70s See New 4pproaches to Capital Financingfor Hospitals, 52 HOSPITALS 131
(1978).
11. See Wolkstein, supra note 9, at 21-25. In describing the effect of the Medicare and Medi-
caid program, Lightle commented that "[t]he reimbursement system itself created incentives for
debt financing. By permitting depreciation and interest as allowable expenses, the reimbursement
system established a mechanism for hospitals to use future revenues to finance capital needs."
Lightle, supra note 10, at 135.
12. ICF, INC., TRENDS IN HOSPITAL CONSTRUCTION AND USE OF FEDERAL SUBSIDIES 14,
31-32 (Phase III Report, Policy Implications, submitted to Health Resources Administration,
Dep't HEW, contract no. HRA-230-77-0083, 1978). Tax-exempt financing increased its share
from 22.5% in 1973 to 34.6% in 1976; insured mortgages maintained a relatively constant percent-
age. The figures cited in another study, Booz, ALLEN & HAMILTON, EVALUATION OF FUTURE
HOSPITAL CAPITALIZATION (1978), are somewhat different, but identify a similar trend. Specifi-
cally, they indicate that the share of construction expenditures funded by all debt issues has in-
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A. Federal Insurance
The federal government lends its credit to hospitals by providing
insurance for mortgages securing loans made to hospitals by tradi-
tional, private-sector lenders. This insurance is made available to pri-
vate nonprofit and proprietary acute care hospitals through the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) pursuant to the provisions of Section
242 of Title II of the Housing and Urban Development Act. l" The
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulates the
financial aspects of the program, in many cases in conjunction with
FHA's housing and other insurance programs. Many of the financing
provisions are the same for several programs; for example, the maxi-
mum allowable interest rate was set, as of May 1979, at 10 percent per
annum for certain FHA loan insurance programs, including its hospital
mortgage program, and for all single family mortgage programs .
4
Similarly, the insurance premium paid by a borrower is .5 percent per
annum for all FHA insurance programs.' 5
HUD delegates the programmatic aspects of the FHA 242 pro-
gram to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
through a formal agreement. 6 HEW's activities include reviewing ap-
plications, monitoring during the construction period, and determining
financial feasibility. The criteria for financing have been established to
creased from 58% in 1973 to 78% in 1977, and that the share allocated to tax-exempt bonds has
increased from 25% to 45% over the same period.
13. The program was amended in 1968 to allow mortgage insurance for hospitals, but only
for private nonprofit, acute care hospitals. P.L. 90-448, § 1501, 82 Stat. 599 (1968) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1715z-7 (1976)). Proprietary hospitals were added to the program in 1970. P.L. 91-609,
§ 110(a), 84 Stat. 1770 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715 (1976)). The program is designed for
hospital projects requiring construction and renovation rather than merely refinancing of existing
indebtedness. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 242.21, .93 (1977). The Housing and Community Development
Amendments of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1715n (Supp. 1 1978), did, however, authorize insurance for
entire refinancings of hospitals under another HUD program.
14. Memorandum from L. Simons, Assistant Secretary, Dep't HUD, to all approved mortga-
gees (April 23, 1979) (copy on file in the office of the North Carolina Law Revlev).
15. In exchange for the insurance, the hospitals pay the FHA an application fee and a com-
mitment fee (together amounting to $3 per thousand) and, in some cases, an inspection fee ($5 per
thousand). 24 C.F.R. §§ 242.3, .7, .9 (1977). They also pay an annual insurance premium of 0.5%
of the outstanding mortgage amount. Id. § 207.252(a). In addition, the mortgagee may collect an
initial service charge of 2% of the original mortgage amount. Id. § 242.19. The term of the mort-
gage is limited to 25 years. Id. § 242.35.
16. DEP'T HEW & DEP'T HUD, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, SECTION 242, NATIONAL
HOUSING ACT, As AMENDED (1978). This superseded an earlier agreement signed in January
1968 and amended in May 1971. Id. The 1978 agreement incorporated the National Guidelines
for Health Planning (no more than four short-stay conforming beds per 1,000 population and a
community-wide occupancy rate in excess of 80%), 42 C.F.R. § 121 (1978). The Secretary of
HUD required that these Guidelines be adopted in final form prior to entering into an agreement
containing them. See Letter from Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary of HUD, to Joseph Califano,
Secretary of HEW (July 25, 1978) (copy on file in the office of the North Carolina Law Reviewp).
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avoid, to the extent possible, defaults that could result in claims against
the insurance. The loan amount is limited to 90 percent of the esti-
mated replacement value of the project or 90 percent of the cost of
development, whichever is lower. 17 As a result, the mortgage is always
backed by a facility that is estimated to be of greater value than the
loan amount, although it may not have a greater actual market value.
Furthermore, prior to approving a loan, HEW must determine that the
project is financially feasible based on reasonable assumptions regard-
ing future events. 8 Finally, there must be a demonstrated need in the
community for the services to be provided by the hospital as evidenced
by the review and approval of state and local health planning agen-
cies. 19 In setting priorities for financing among eligible projects, how-
ever, HEW has not worked closely with these agencies.
The left side of Diagram 1 illustrates the security for an investor in
an FHA 242 insured hospital. The investor or mortgagee initially relies
upon the hospital's agreement to pay debt service and then upon the
pledge of the gross revenues of the hospital.2° The additional security
accruing to an investor in an FHA 242 mortgage is illustrated by com-
paring the position of such an investor after a project has defaulted
with that of an investor in a similar, but uninsured mortgage.2 1 When
the uninsured project's revenues proved to be insufficient to pay debt
service, the investor would foreclose on the mortgage and force a sale.
With a first lien, the investor would be entitled to priority in distribu-
tion of foreclosure sale proceeds. Yet, it is unlikely that a forced sale
would yield an amount even approaching the replacement value of the
facility and, therefore, unlikely that the investor would recoup the
amount of the outstanding mortgage. Moreover, a significant delay
would inevitably be involved in realizing any recovery.
17. 24 C.F.R. §§ 242.27, .29(c) (1977). This provision applies to the construction of new
projects. The maximum mortgage amount for a rehabilitation project depends upon how the
original property is held, and whether there is an outstanding mortgage. Id. § 242.29.
18. HEALTH RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T HEW, HEALTH CARE FACILITIES LOAN
PROGRAM: POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 60-70 (1976). In addition, the New York Re-
gional Office published more detailed requirements for financial feasibility studies. DIVISION OF
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, PHS REGIONAL OFFICE II, HEALTH CARE FACILITIES HANDBOOK:
FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY REVIEW AND LOAN MONITORING PROCEDURES 11-20 (1977).
19. 24 C.F.R. § 242.5 (1978). But see generall, Schonbrun, Making Cerificate of Need Work,
this Symposium.
20. The pledge of revenues can take two forms-all unrestricted revenues ("gross revenues")
or unrestricted revenues after payment of operating costs ("net revenues"). Projects benefitting
from the FHA 242 program pledge their gross revenues. This device is similar to the traditional
"assignment of rents" taken by the mortgage lender on a commercial or residential rental project.
21. The mortgage would be similar in that it constituted a first mortgage lien and was in an
amount close to 90% of the replacement value of the project.
1979] 1387
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DIAGRAM I



















FHA 242 INSURANCE FHA 242 INSURANCE
WITH GNMA PARTICIPATION
When FHA 242 insurance is available, however, the investor
avoids both the uncertainties of valuation of the property and the de-
lays of a sale. Upon default, the investor in most cases either assigns
the mortgage or conveys the title (which it has acquired through fore-
closure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure) to FHA and collects on the
insurance an amount equal to the outstanding principal balance of the
mortgage.22 When a claim is made, the insurance proceeds are not
22. 24 C.F.R. § 207.258 (1977). In certain very limited cases the mortgagee may choose not
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paid in cash but in debentures, a form of registered U.S. Treasury
bond. The interest rate on the debentures is set at the time the mort-
gage is issued and is usually lower than the interest rate on the mort-
gage. For mortgages entered into on or after January 1, 1979, the
debentures are for a term of twenty years and pay an interest rate of
eight percent per annum with full payment of principal at the expira-
tion of the twenty years regardless of the term and interest rate of the
mortgage loan. 3 (FHA can choose to pay in cash, but historically has
chosen not to for the FHA 242 program.) In almost all cases, this form
of payment means that the investor does not receive full return on the
investment. The interest rate is lower on the debentures than on the
original mortgage and will not yield the full value of the mortgage.
Similarly, the investor is likely to incur a loss if he elects to sell the
debentures for cash since the relatively low interest rate usually re-
quires trading at a discount.
In order to eliminate the risk of investors losing on their invest-
ments, and thereby to increase the number of investors interested in the
mortgages, the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA),
an organization created to improve liquidity in the market, is often in-
terposed between the mortgage holder and the FHA 242 insurance.
2 4
Under this arrangement, illustrated on the right hand side of Diagram
1, the FHA insured mortgage is pledged to GNMA as backing for its
own securities, and the original levels of security then inure to GNMA.
The original mortgagee continues to make collections and service the
mortgage. If a project defaults, GNMA collects on the FHA 242 insur-
ance, and FHA is responsible for foreclosure. The investor holds
GNMA securities and continues to receive full payment in cash
whether or not the hospital itself makes required payments. Since
GNMA securities are ultimately backed by federal government appro-
priations, investors face almost no risk of losing principal or interest
payments and hold a readily marketable security. Therefore, they are
more willing to invest in FHA 242 projects that are combined with
GNMA securities than in FHA 242 projects alone.
to call upon the insurance but to foreclose directly and retain the sale proceeds. ( This option is not
illustrated in Diagram 1.)
23. 24 C.F.R. § 207.259 (1977), as amended by 44 Fed. Reg. 23516 (1979).
24. In describing the origin of the GNMA, the Housing and Development Reporter states:
"The Government National Mortgage Association. . . provides a secondary market for certain
mortgages which would not be well received in the private secondary market. It also provides a
source of secondary market financing for other types of mortgages in periods of tight credit."
[1979] 7 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 81.
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As Table 1 indicates, from 1969, when the FHA 242 program be-
gan, through September 1977, hospital mortgages were insured for ap-
proximately $1.7 billion, an average of over $12 million per project.25
There was, however, no consistent trend over that period of time in the
number of projects insured each year, the average dollar value of the
projects or the total value of insurance issued each year.
26
TABLE 127
FHA-242 MORTGAGE INSURANCE VALUE AND
TOTAL PROJECT VALUE BY YEAR OF APPROVAL, 1969-1977
Year of Number of FHA Mortgage Total Average
Approval Projects Insurance Value Project Value Project Value
($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions)
1969 4 $ 37.68 $ 55.90 $13.98
1970 15 113.38 156.68 10.45
1971 20 259.79 345.47 17.27
1972 14 162.43 228.84 16.35
1973 20 225.97 335.06 16.75
1974 15 124.89 252.13 16.81
1975 13 82.25 147.66 11.35
1976 32 603.53 823.50 25.73
1977 (9 mos.) 6 102.27 110.03 13.37
Total 139 $1,712.19 $2,475.27 $17.81
B. Tax-Exempt Financing
State and local governments have assisted nonprofit hospitals in
capital financing by providing low cost funds through the issuance of
tax-exempt bonds. The first tax-exempt bonds for other than a public
hospital were issued by the Connecticut Health and Educational Facili-
ties Authority in 1967.28 Since that time, forty-eight states have author-
ized such tax-exempt financing. Some have set up statewide hospital
financing programs in either discrete health financing authorities29 or
in authorities financing other projects such as educational facilities.3 °
25. The FHA 242 mortgage represented, on the average, 69.2% of the value of the total
project.
26. ICF, INC., supra note 12, at 68.
27. The source forithis table is id. at 17.
28. Letter from Robert C. Hector, Executive Director, State of Connecticut Health and Edu-
cational Facilities Authority, to author (March 30, 1979) (copy on file in the office of the North
Carolina Law Review). The bonds were sold competitively at a net interest cost of 5.7%. Id.
29. Examples include the New Jersey Health Care Facilities Financing Authority, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26-21 (West Cum. Supp. 1978), and the North Carolina Medical Care Commission, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 131A (Supp. 1977).
30. Examples include the Connecticut Health and Educational Facilities Authority, CONN.
CAPITAL FINANCING
Others have authorized local governmental units to issue tax-exempt
bonds for hospitals.3 Table 2 outlines the options available to hospi-
tals in each state. The state and local governments expect two major
benefits from authorizing and providing tax-exempt financing. First,
hospital construction is encouraged-an important consideration where
expansion or modernization and renovation is desired. Second, to the
extent tax-exempt financing is substituted for financing with higher in-
terest costs, expenditures for health care are lowered. The direct bene-
fits to states in lower expenditures for Medicaid are somewhat offset by
a loss of state (and local) income tax collections in states with such
taxes, and in which the income on the bonds is exempt. Most of the tax
revenue loss occurs, however, at the federal level. 2
The legal structure and program guidelines imposed on participat-
ing hospitals vary widely across states and, in some cases, across pro-
grams within states. For example, the agreement between the financing
authority and the hospital can be in the form of a mortgage or a lease;
the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York has issued bonds
backed by both forms of agreement. The Authority may require a first
mortgage lien on the entire hospital, regardless of the portion of the
hospital actually involved in the construction project, or require a lien
only on the specific asset financed.33 The New York State Housing Fi-
nance Agency has taken the former position 34 and the Idaho Health
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-335 (West Cum. Supp. 1979), and the Massachusetts Health and Educa-
tional Facilities Authority, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 53, §§ 1-23 (Law. Co-op. 1979).
31. In Pennsylvania, for example, there are over fifty local authorities that have issued tax-
exempt hospital bonds. See BUTCHER & SINGER, INC., HOSPITAL AUTHORITIES OF THE COM-
MONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DECEMBER 31, 1978 YEAR-END BOND VALUATIONS (1979) (copy
on file in the office of the North Carolina Law Review). See also PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2199.5
(Purdon Supp. 1979).
32. See 16 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.. § 2199.5 (Purdon Supp. 1979); ,J. PETERSON, CHANGING
CONDITIONS IN THE MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL SECURITIES (1976). See generally JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 94th CONG., 2d SESs., CHANGING CONDITIONS IN THE MARKET FOR
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT (Comm. Print 1976).
33. The major advantages of a first mortgage lien on the entire hospital are that all of the
revenues of the hospital are pledged and that, in case of foreclosure, the property obtained will be
an operating hospital. The major advantages of obtaining a first mortgage lien on only that por-
tion of the hospital financed are that a revenue producing entity such as a laundry can be financed
without disturbing existing financing arrangements, and that new mortgages for additional con-
struction can be obtained from alternate sources without refinancing the existing mortgage.
34. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2874 (McKinney 1979).
19791 1391
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HEALTH FACILITIES FINANCING AUTHORITIES
State
Authority State Legislation
For Issuing Enabling Governmental


































New York X (4)
North Carolina X X














West Virginia - X
Wisconsin (3) X
Wyoming - X
Total 24 (18 active) 34
(1) Statute requires amendment. (2) Established but inactive.
(3) Awaiting test case. (4) Suffolk County only.
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Facilities Authority the latter.36 Finally, the terms of the agreements
vary greatly. The variables include duration of the loan, repayment
schedule (level principal, level debt service or some other arrange-
ment), maximum loan size, availability of construction financing, avail-
ability of equipment financing, amount of refinancing permitted and
amount of total project cost that the hospital must raise from its own
funds.
The initial security for all bonds is the capacity of the financed
hospital to generate sufficient revenue to repay interest, principal, and
required reserves as well as to continue meeting operating costs. The
financing programs vary, however, in the additional tiers of security
they provide the investors.37 The first potential level of security above
the revenue generating capacity of the hospital is a debt-service reserve
fund sufficient to pay the hospital's debt service obligations for a cer-
tain period of time (usually less than two years) while the hospital is
encountering short-term financial problems or foreclosure proceedings
are underway. Bonds secured by the revenue stream of a hospital or by
the revenue stream plus a debt-service reserve fund are revenue bonds.
The next potential level of security is a pledge by a governmental entity
to repay the bonds if the hospital cannot. Such a pledge can take two
forms: a "moral obligation" under which a governmental entity is au-
thorized but not legally required to make funds available for payments,
or a "legal obligation" or "general obligation" under which a govern-
mental entity is required to make payments and must even raise taxes if
necessary to meet the debt service obligations. Examples of both types
are illustrated in Diagram 2; numerous variations involving different
combinations of security tiers exist.
In addition to the type of security, the marketability of bonds and
their interest rates depend upon the credibility and reputation of the
issuing entity in the market, the creditworthiness of the particular hos-
pital, the extent to which the bonds are collateralized, the type of hospi-
tal reimbursement in the particular state, the extent to which interest
the Council of Health Facilities Financing Authorities, Spring Meeting (Feb. 28-March 3, 1979,
Denver, Colo.).
36. IDAHO CODE § 39-1450 (1978 Supp.).
37. For example, to secure the pledge of payment by the hospital, most authorities, before
turning to another level of security, require a pledge of the gross or net revenues of the hospital
and establishment of a mechanism to assure access to such revenues if the hospital fails to make a
required payment. For a definition of gross and net revenue pledges, see note 20 supra. See, e.g.,
Regulatory Agreement Between Lutheran Medical Center and Commissioner of Health of the
State of New York (Nov. 19, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Regulatory Agreement] (copy on file in
the office of the North Carolina Law Review).
19791 1393
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DIAGRAM 2
TAX-EXEMPT BOND FINANCING: STRUCTURE OF SECURITY
REVENUE BONDS
"General Obligation" 1 (5)
OR
"Moral Obligation"






payments on the bonds are tax exempt (federal, state, and local), the
term of the bonds, the size of the issue, the rating assigned by the prin-
cipal rating agencies (Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Standard
and Poor's Corp.), whether the bonds are publicly sold or privately
placed, and the market conditions at the time the bonds are sold.38 The
range of interest rates on tax-exempt hospital bonds is a substantial
reflection of this array of variables. In 1978, the interest rates ranged
38. For a discussion of characteristics of bond issues that affect marketability, see NEW YORK
INSTITUTE OF FINANCE, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 27-31 (rev. ed. 1978).
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from 4.2 percent on a $345,000 general obligation issue of the Kalkaska
County (Michigan) Hospital Authority, to 9.8 percent on a $4.9 million
revenue issue of the Huntsville (Alabama) Medical Clinic Board.
39
Wide variations occur even among the issues of a single authority. For
example, in 1978, the Maryland Health and Higher Educational Facili-
ties Authority sold one $10 million issue at an interest rate of 6.75 per-
cent40 and another issue of over $15 million at 8 percent.41
From 1972 to 1977, total tax-exempt financing for hospitals na-
tionwide was estimated at $12 billion, of which an estimated $3.2 bil-
lion was for refinancing existing indebtedness, $5.8 billion for actual
construction, and $3.0 billion for capitalized interest, debt service re-
serve fund deposits and other nonconstruction costs.42 Annual tax-ex-
empt financing for hospitals escalated from an estimated $.5 billion in
1972 to $4.9 billion in 1977.41 The use, however, was not evenly dis-
tributed across the country-fifteen states accounted for over 75 per-
cent of all tax-exempt financing."
39. Winders, Tax Exempt Financingfor Hospitals Drops 34% in '78 to $3,121,689,400, THE
DAILY BOND BUYER, January 19, 1979, at 1, 10-13.
40. Official Statement, $10,030,000, Maryland Health and Higher Educational Facilities Au-
thority, Revenue Bonds, Suburban Hospital Issue, Series A (June 28, 1978) (copy on file in the
office of the North Carolina Law Review).
41. Official Statement, $15,290,000 Maryland Health and Higher Educational Facilities Au-
thority, Revenue Bonds, Howard County General Hospital Issue, Series A (November 21, 1978)
(copy on file in the office of the North Carolina Law Review).
42. See ICF, INC., supra note 12, at 15 (Table 11-7). Two major sources of data on tax-
exempt financing by hospitals are the American Hospital Association's Survey of the Sources of
Funding/or Hospital Construction, which appears annually in HosPiTALS, and THE DAILY BOND
BUYER. The American Hospital Association Survey does not cover the universe of hospitals in the
United States and involves only construction financing and not refinancing. THE DAILY BOND
BUYER reports all public and some negotiated sales of hospital tax-exempt revenue bonds. It is
not possible, however, to extrapolate the number of hospitals involved because some authorities
finance multiple projects in a single bond issue, others finance a single project in more than one
bond issue, and some finance and then refinance the same project. Moreover, all negotiated sales
are not reflected. As a result there are no accurate estimates of the number of hospitals that have
received the benefits of tax-exempt financing.
During 1977 and early 1978 when interest rates were at a low ebb relative to earlier periods, a
significant number of advance refundings of hospital revenue bonds were undertaken. In an ad-
vance refunding, bonds are issued to redeem bonds that are outstanding at a higher interest rate.
The primary goal of such refundings is, in most cases, to lower interest costs over the life of a bond
issue. However, the Internal Revenue Service proposed restrictive regulations in September 1978,
43 Fed. Reg. 39,822 (1978), revised in October, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,675 (1978) and issued in final form
in June 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,657 (1979). These regulations work to limit the amount of costs of
issuance that could be included within the arbitrage limitation, and therefore constrained the
number of projects for which advance refunding was advantageous. Even before the regulations
were adopted in final form, authorities complied with them to avoid the consequences of a poten-
tial future determination that bonds issued subsequent to the proposed regulations are arbitrage
bonds and therefore not exempt from federal income taxes.
43. ICF, INC., supra note 12, at 15.
44. Id.
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C Combined Federally Insured Tax-Exempt Financing
Recently, FHA 242 insurance with GNMA participation was com-
bined with tax-exempt financing, resulting in significantly lower long-
term interest rates than a hospital could have obtained from either a
conventional FHA 242/GNMA combination or tax-exempt financing
alone.4 5 As depicted in Diagram 3, the participants included the hospi-
tal, the hospital financing authority, FHA, GNMA, and a financial or-
ganization that is both an FHA-approved mortgagee and an approved
issuer of GNMA securities (the original mortgagee). The hospital ar-
ranged for FHA 242 insurance and a commitment from GNMA for
issuance of GNMA mortgage-backed securities. Simultaneous with the
mortgage closing, the authority issued tax-exempt bonds and agreed to
use the proceeds to purchase GNMA securities as they were issued. In
the meantime, the proceeds of the authority's tax-exempt bond issue
were invested in United States Government obligations. When the
hospital drew down the mortgage funds from the original mortgagee,
GNMA issued securities in the amount of the advance. The authority
liquidated its investment of the bond proceeds and purchased the
GNMA securities from the original mortgagee. The original mortga-
gee's investment was taken out with each advance. Ultimately, the
original mortgagee had no financial investment but remained the mort-
gagee of record. The risk of the investor in the authority bonds was de
minimus throughout this process: authority bonds were backed at all
times by United States Government obligations. The first financing of
this type was accomplished by the Dormitory Authority of the State of
New York in August 1978.46
From the point of view of the hospitals and the states, this was the
ideal financing method: the hospital paid an exceptionally low interest
rate, and the state or state authority had virtually no risk. Within the
federal government, however, serious questions were raised regarding
the appropriateness of combining exemption from federal income tax
with what is essentially a federally guaranteed security. The first con-
cern was the amount of federal subsidy provided. Early in the discus-
45. BLYTH EASTMAN DILLON HEALTH CARE FUNDING, INC., FHA/GNMA/TAx-ExEMIpr
COMBINATION PROGRAM-A NEW FINANCING ALTERNATIVE FOR HOSPITALS (1978).
46. Private Placement Memorandum, Dormitory Authority of the State of New York,
GNMA Collateralized Bond Issue: The Elizabeth A. Horton Memorial Hospital, Middletown,
New York (July 5, 1978) (copy on file in the office of the North Carolina Law Revieiw).
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sions of this methodology, the President of GNMA summarized the
issue:
[W]e are concerned with the broad policy implications of knowingly
guaranteeing securities which will in turn be used to collateralize tax
exempt local debt. The use of tax exempt debt reduces Federal Gov-
ernment revenues and this loss of revenues represents a subsidy to
the bond issuers that must be paid for by taxpayers in general."
The second concern was the extent of the security provided to the hold-
ers of tax-exempt bonds: "The Treasury has traditionally opposed the
combination of federal guarantees and tax exemption on the grounds
that it creates a security which is better than the government's own ob-
ligations. ' 48 The third concern was that the financial configuration en-
tirely removed the financial feasibility of the hospital project itself from
the scrutiny of the marketplace. The tax-exempt bonds were rated and
purchased on the basis of the guarantee of the federal government. Fi-
nally, the methodology was being pursued (but was never applied) in
the housing area, which had a much larger potential volume and, there-
fore, a greater potential for draining the federal coffers by reducing
income tax collections.
As a result of these concerns, this method of hospital financing was
discontinued by HUD in early 1979 for hospitals and proscribed for all
housing except low-income, multi-family subsidized housing.49 At the
time, only four hospital financings using this method had been com-
pleted throughout the country,50 but a significant number of applica-
tions were pending. The negative aspects of these combination
financings---especially the loss of tax revenue-apparently outweighed
the salutary effects of lower health care costs. Efforts to reverse this
decision, including a suit by one hospital closed out of the program5'
47. Letter from John Dalton, President, GNMA, to J. Christopher McCurdy, Assistant Vice
President, Mercantile Mortgage Company (June 14, 1978). Dalton eventually approved a project
that employed the methodology; Letter from John Dalton to Edward Shapoff, Senior Vice Presi-
dent, Blyth Eastman Dillon Health Care Funding, Inc. (July 21, 1978) (copies on file in the office
of the North Carolina Law Review).
48. [1978] 6 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 426.
49. Telegram from Lawrence Simons, Assistant Secretary, HUD, to all Regional Housing
Administrators, Area Office Managers, and Insuring Office Directors (March 29, 1979) (copy on
file in the office of the North Carolina Law Review); see Ferris, HUD Eliminates Federal Guaran-
tees ofHousing, Hospital Bond Issues, THE DAILY BOND BUYER, April 5, 1979, at 1, 18.
50. The four projects were: Elizabeth A. Horton Memorial Hospital, Dormitory Authority of
the State of New York, $26,078,100; United Hospital, Dormitory Authority of the State of New
York, $19,890,000; Raritan Bay Health Services Corporation, New Jersey Health Care Facilities
Financing Authority, $22,610,000; Walther Memorial Hospital, $9,013,700, Illinois Health Facili-
ties Authority.
51. Beth Israel Medical Center v. Harris, No. 79-1038 (D.D.C., filed April 1I, 1979).
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and a vigorous campaign by underwriting firms, have been unsuccess-
ful to date. Unless there is a policy or statutory change,52 the four out-
standing projects will remain anomalies.
II. GOVERNMENT FINANCING IN NEW YORK
The State of New York's entry into the arena of tax-exempt
financing for hospitals was closely linked with its early efforts at health
planning. In 1964, the state established a statewide health planning
network-the first certificate of need program in the nation.53 The
original approach was modified and strengthened in 196554 as a result
of the recommendations of a citizen's group appointed by the Governor
to review hospital services.55  The regulation of hospitals was consoli-
dated in one agency, the Department of Health (Department). The De-
partment was given authority not only to approve construction
proposals, but also to control reimbursement and review quality of
care.
The citizen's group outlined the steps they believed were required
for planning a better health care system within the state.56 An impor-
52. U.S. Representative John J. Cavanaugh has indicated that he will introduce legislation
"grandfathering" hospital projects that were under consideration at the time the HUD decision
was made. See Ferris, Plan to Allow HUD Hospital Deals to Proceed is Expected Today, THE
DAILY BOND BUYER, June 6, 1979, at 1, 18; Treasury Expresses Misgivings About HUD Hospital
Bonds, THE DAILY BOND BUYER, May 23, 1979, at 1; Compromise Measure Eyedto "Grandfather"
Hospital Deals, THE DAILY BOND BUYER, May 21, 1979, at 15.
53. Act of April 22, 1964, ch. 730, 1964 N.Y. Laws 1883 (codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2904(a) (McKinney 1977)), created the Hospital Review and Planning Council (HRPC), com-
prised primarily of representatives of the health care delivery industry, and seven regional hospital
planning councils. The HRPC, with the advice of the regional councils, was to consider and
review all applications for the incorporation or establishment of new health institutions, and all
proposals for construction or renovation. In addition, this Act established the four fundamental
tests for approval of establishment or construction by the Department of Health or, at the time,
the Board of Social Welfare: (i) public need, (ii) character and competence of sponsor or owner,
(iii) financial resources, (iv) such other matters as it shall deem pertinent. ld. § 2801(a)(2).
54. Act of July 19, 1965, ch. 795, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1873 (codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§§ 2800-2809 (McKinney 1977)).
55. The Governor's Committee on Hospital Costs was a committee of citizens appointed on
May 25, 1964, by Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller. Report of the Governor's Committee on Hos-
pital Costs 2 (1965). The mandate to the Committee was:
(1) to study the costs of general hospital care in the State and to make recommendations
as to how hospitals may best provide high quality care at the lowest possible cost and (2)
to examine the present apportionment of responsibility among State agencies concerned
with hospital care and to make recommendations as to how the responsibility of State
government may be most effectively carried out.
Id.
56. The objectives of the planning process envisioned by the Committee were as follows:
(1) Inventory the existing health care system (During this step the interrelationships
among facilities would be defined, such as the effect additional long term care beds
would have on the need for acute care hospital beds within an area.), (2) Define a health
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tant tool for implementing the plan was a program for financing hospi-
tal plant modernization, rehabilitation and replacement:
The Committee stresses the community nature of the responsi-
bility for making up the backlog of plant needs, both those of obso-
lescence and those of currently needed but unbuilt structures. It also
calls attention to the opportunity implicit in broad-based community
financing for replenishment and expansion of plant to impart system-
atic community-wide pattern to the configuration of facilities. This
can be done by making public financing contingent upon the compli-
ance of sponsors with the specifications and ideals of well-conceived
community plans.
5 7
The Committee called for a major program of state funding for these
projects, preferably through low-interest, long-term loans. This recom-
mendation was implemented for nursing homes in 196658 and for hos-
pitals in 1970.19
The hospital financing program that was created reflected the leg-
islative intent of the statute:
Many hospitals and other health facilities throughout the state are
becoming obsolete and are no longer adequate to meet the needs of
modem medicine. As a result of rapid technological changes, such
facilities require substantial structural or functional changes. Others
are unsuited for continued use by virtue of their existing plants and
care system which matches appropriate resources to people's health needs (This kind of
system could remove duplicative services, assure accessibility to health care, and mini-
mize the number of people receiving care in excess of their needs.), and (3) Design a"plan of action" which would be a goal oriented planning process showing how to move
from the existing to the desired health care system.
LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON EXPENDITURE REvIEW, HEALTH PLANNING IN NEW YORK STATE
S-I to S-2 (Program Audit, January 3, 1977).
57. Report of the Governor's Committee on Hospital Costs, supra note 55, at 77. The Com-
mittee also recommended a similar program for nursing homes. Id. at 77-78.
58. In 1965 the New York Legislature gave final approval to an amendment of the New York
Constitution which recognized the public purpose of providing nursing home accommodations to
individuals with low income. The amendment, which modified art. 4, §§ 1, 2, was approved at the
1965 general election and became effective on January 1, 1966. See 1966 N.Y. Laws 3552-53
(appendix). The legislature implemented the constitutional authorization in 1966 by enacting the
Nursing Home Companies Law, 1966 N.Y. Laws 2425 (codified at N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW
§§ 2850-2866 (McKinney 1977)), and amending the Private Housing Finance Law to authorize the
New York State Housing Finance Agency (HFA) to issue bonds for nursing homes, Act of July
28, 1966, ch. 813, 1966 N.Y. Laws 2435 (codified at N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW §§ 2850-2866 (Mc-
Kinney 1977)).
59. In 1969, the Legislature gave final approval to an amendment of the New York Constitu-
tion which established a new § 7 of art. XVII authorizing loans to hospitals. The amendment was
approved at the 1969 general election and became effective on January 1, 1970. See 1970 N.Y.
Laws 3530 (appendix). During 1969, the legislature enacted the Hospital Mortgage Loan Con-
struction Law, 1969 N.Y. Laws 2602 (codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2870-2882 (McKin-
ney 1977)) and amended the Private Housing Finance Law to authorize HFA to issue bonds for
hospitals. The law was to become effective only in the event that the constitutional amendment
was approved by the electorate. Id.
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should be replaced. Such inadequate and outmoded facilities deny
to the people of the state the benefits of health care of the highest
qualit r, efficiency, and promptly provided at a reasonable cost
4. Housing Finance Agency
The New York State Housing Finance Agency (HFA) was the
agency designated to implement this program. A brief review of the
history of HFA explains this designation as well as the financial and
programmatic structure of the hospital program. When created in
1960, HFA's mandate was to finance the construction of low and mid-
dle-income, multi-family housing throughout the state by selling bonds
to the private sector to obtain funds to make mortgage loans.61 It was
an independent public benefit corporation chartered by a special act of
the legislature in response to growing voter reluctance to approve refer-
enda authorizing state financing of housing by the issuance of state
debt.
62
New York and other states had frequently by-passed voter refer-
enda and other constitutional limitations on debt issuance by creating
independent authorities to issue revenue bonds, but HFA was the first
such authority created to finance privately owned housing.63 The se-
curity for HFA bonds was different from that of earlier bonds. The
"moral obligation" of the state was explicitly stated as additional secur-
ity for the bonds.' This tier of security was necessary to improve the
60. Act of May 26, 1969, ch. 1035, 1969 N.Y. Laws 2602 (codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2871 (McKinney 1977)).
61. See New York State Housing Agency Act, N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 41(2) (McKin-
ney 1976).
62. MORELAND ACT COMMISSION ON THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND OTHER STATE
FINANCING AGENCIES, RESTORING CREDIT AND CONFIDENCE: A REFORM PROGRAM FOR NEW
YORK STATE AND ITS PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 88 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MORELAND ACT CoM-
MISSION]. For a brief summary of the origin and history of HFA see A. WALSH, THE PUBLIC'S
BUSINESS 129-40 (1978).
63. For a discussion of the manner in which New York and other states have circumvented
debt limitations and referenda requirements, see Utevsky, The Future of Nonguaranteed Bond Fi-
nancing in New York, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 863 (1977).
64. The actual wording of the so called "moral obligation" provision is as follows:
In order further to assure the maintenance of such debt service reserve funds, there shall
be annually apportioned and paid to the agency for deposit in each debt service reserve
fund such sum, if any, as shall be certified by the chairman ... to the governor and
director of the budget as necessary to restore such reserve fund to an amount equal to the
maximum amount of principal and interest maturing and becoming due and sinking
fund payments required to be made in any succeeding calendar year on the ... bonds of
the agency then outstanding and secured by such reserve fund. The chairman. . . shall
annually, on or before December first, make and deliver to the governor and director of
the budget his certificate stating the sum, if any, required to restore each such reserve
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marketability of the bonds.65 Also, HFA bonds were backed by the
revenues of a number of projects-a "pool"-rather than the revenues
of an individual project. 6 This avoided the more expensive and time
consuming process of selling a myriad of small bond issues, and pro-
vided additional security for investors.67
The HFA, unlike the Port of New York Authority,68 the New
York Power Authority, and other authorities in existence at the time,
was primarily a financing, and not a development authority. 69 As a
consequence, in the housing program the private sponsor of the hous-
ing project was responsible for project plan, design and construction,
and a separate state regulatory agency supervised all aspects of the pro-
ject from construction to operation.70
Almost as soon as it began, HFA's role was expanded. It was au-
thorized to finance construction of the State University system in
1962,7' mental hygiene facilities in 196372 and municipal health facili-
ties in 1968. 73 The bonds for each program were independently se-
cured, one from the other, by a separate one-year debt service reserve
fund and the assets and revenues were segregated and separately
pledged.74
The hospital and nursing home programs were logical additions to
fund to the amount aforesaid, and the sum or sums so certified, if any, shall be appor-
tioned and paid to the agency during the then current state fiscal year.
N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 47(5)(c) (McKinney 1976).,
65. For a discussion of the origin of the "moral obligation" concept, and the perceptions of
the individuals involved in establishing the first "moral obligation" bonds for HFA, see MORE-
LAND AcT COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 108-15, and A. WALSH, supra note 62, at 129-33.
66. While the individual bonds cannot be identified with a particular project, the proceeds of
the bond and note issues are strictly segregated on a project by project basis. Therefore, the
projects for which the proceeds are to be used and the amounts for each project are specifically
identified at the time of the bond or note sale. MORELAND AcT COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 96-
97.
67. Many of HFA's mortgages, especially housing and nursing home mortgages, are for rela-
tively small amounts (less than $10 million). Some of the costs of a bond issue do not vary signifi-
cantly with the size of the issue so there are economies of scale (both for expenses and for record-
keeping) in undertaking pooled issues. Id.
68. The "Port of New York Authority" is now known as the "Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey." See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6404 (McKinney 1979).
69. MORELAND AcT COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 86-97.
70. The Commissioner of Housing and Community Renewal was responsible for such super-
vision. See N.Y. PRIv. Hous. LAW §§ 43, 44, 44-a, 44-b, 50, 55 (McKinney 1976).
71. Act of March 30, 1962, ch. 251, § 381, 1962 N.Y. Laws 1073 (codified at N.Y. PRIV.
Hous. FIN. LAW § 47-a (McKinney 1976)).
72. Act of April 30, 1963, ch. 932, § 29-1, 1963 N.Y. Laws 2867 (codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWS § 4414 (McKinney 1979)).
73. Health and Mental Hygiene Facilities Improvement Act, ch. 359, § 14, 1968 N.Y. Laws
1348 (codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 4414 (McKinney 1979)).
74. See Official Statement of New York State Housing Finance Agency, Health Facilities
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HFA's repertoire and were modeled after the existing mortgage pro-
grams.75 The financial structure closely followed that of all of HFA's
programs: the bonds were backed by a one year's debt service reserve
fund and the state's "moral obligation," and were sold for a pool com-
prised of a number of projects. The program structure closely followed
that of HFA's housing mortgage programs and HFA's role was
primarily financing, not project development. Private nonprofit hospi-
tals and nursing homes were responsible for initiating projects, ob-
taining necessary approvals, and contracting with private firms to
construct the projects. They were, however, subject to the statutorily
mandated supervision of the State Commissioner of Health (Commis-
sioner). The structure of the HFA hospital and nursing home program
is quite different from that of most other state tax-exempt hospital pro-
grams, which employ individual revenue bonds and are not directly
linked with the state health regulatory agency.
The HFA hospital financing program was designed to provide
construction and start-up funds for new hospitals and for extensive
modernizations and renovations of existing hospitals. This had impor-
tant ramifications for the structure of the program. HFA required a
first mortgage lien on the entire operating hospital regardless of the
actual construction financed,76 a pledge of all the revenues of the hospi-
tal77 and an entirely code-conforming hospital at the completion of the
construction program. (A code-conforming hospital does not run the
risk of significant revenue losses from the decertification of non-code-
conforming portions of the existing hospital.) This approach provided
the most extensive security for the bondholders. In the event a hospital
defaults on payments, HFA can intercept revenues to meet its mortgage
obligations through the pledge of the hospital's gross receipts. If fore-
closure becomes necessary, HFA's first morgage lien on the entire hos-
pital assures that the property taken is an operating hospital that can
continue to provide services and generate revenue. As a corollary,
however, the first mortgage lien on the entire hospital and the pledge of
Bond Anticipation Notes 2 (April 10, 1979) (copy on file in the office of the North Carolina Law
Review).
75. The hospital program is authorized by N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2870-2882 (McKinney
1977). The nursing home program was authorized by id. §§ 2850-2869.
76. Id.; see note 34 supra.
77. The hospitals are required to pledge their gross revenues, including income, earnings and
receipts regardless of their source (excluding, however, any revenues, income, receipts and earn-
ings which are expressly restricted by law or any instrument of deed, trust or will as to their use or
application). A specific mechanism was put in place to capture these revenues should payments
not be made. See, e.g., Regulatory Agreement, supra note 37.
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all hospital revenues mean that for any additional capital borrowing
for renovation or expansion, the hospital must either increase its HFA
mortgage or refinance it. Thus, HFA must be prepared to consider
mortgage increases when additional construction is necessary.
There are additional ramifications of directing the program toward
new projects or major reconstructions. Many hospital projects that
would be eligible for financing by authorities in some other states were
automatically excluded from consideration by HFA. For example,
HFA did not finance small projects that were self-supporting in rela-
tion to the overall hospital complex, such as laundries and parking ga-
rages, but for which the hospital was unwilling to pledge its entire
facility and gross revenues. Hospitals with substantial outstanding in-
debtedness also were ineligible. Initially, the statute did not even pro-
vide for refinancing of existing indebtedness; it was later amended to
permit refinancing of mortgages held by institutional lenders in
amounts reasonably related to the construction program.
78
In implementing the program, HFA and the Commissioner had
different orientations and, in some cases, different concerns. HFA's re-
sponsibilities under the statute,79 bond resolution,80 and mortgage8
centered implicitly on protecting the interests of its bondholders. This
involved, among other activities, reviewing the financial viability of the
project and assuring that the property was unencumbered. 2
The Commissioner, on the other hand, had two levels of responsi-
bility. His primary responsibilities under the general provisions of the
Public Health Law were to assure that health care was readily available
to the citizens of the state, was of high quality and was reasonably
priced.83 At the same time, under the provisions specifically relating to
the HFA program, he had special responsibilities for hospitals financed
by HFA. These responsibilities were directed primarily toward main-
taining the revenue generating capacity of the hospital and thereby
protecting the investor. They included identifying projects for HFA
78. Act of June 17, 1971, ch. 583, § 1, 1971 N.Y. Laws 878 (codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTII
LAW § 2872(5) (McKinney 1977)).
79. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 41(2) (McKinney 1976).
80. New York State Housing Finance Agency, Resolution Adopted Jan. 8, 1970, Authorizing
Issuance of New York State Housing Finance Agency Hospital and Nursing Home Project Bonds,
and Supplemental Resolution adopted Oct. 3, 1977 (copies on file in the office of the North Caro-
lina Law Review).
81. See Standardized Form Mortgage of the New York State Housing Finance Agency
(1970) (copy on file in the office of the Norlh Carolina Law Review).
82. Id.
83. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2800 (McKinney 1977).
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financing that were needed on a planning basis and were financially
viable, supervising ongoing operations, and actually intervening and
operating the hospital should it encounter serious difficulties or be im-
properly managed.84
Ideally, the Commissioner's responsibilities were to be mutually
supporting: projects were only to be undertaken in the context of a
comprehensive plan for hospital care that took into consideration the
long-range needs of the communities and then only after a review of
their cost effectiveness. In actual practice, however, once the projects
were operational, there was a potential for conflict. Projects that had
met existing community needs when they were planned, could be made
superfluous by factors such as changes in medical practice patterns,
demographics, or the standards of need and occupancy set by the Com-
missioner. Yet, the consideration the Commissioner could give to re-
ducing the services provided or imposing financial restrictions had,
necessarily, to be weighed against his responsibilities for assuring the
continued operation of the project.
In implementing the program, HFA and the Commissioner
worked cooperatively, but pursued their own responsibilities. This
overlap in responsibilities acted as a check and balance. The Commis-
sioner identified projects for HFA consideration from those hospitals
that had successfully hurdled the certificate of need and other review
procedures required for all hospital construction regardless of source of
financing. There were no specifically articulated criteria for selecting
among approved projects, and the Commissioner thus had full discre-
tion in making his selections. As a result, the Commissioner was often
subject to intense pressure from hospitals interested in obtaining
financing and from local representatives concerned with improving the
health care services in their areas.
Once a project was designated for consideration by HFA, specific
reviews and certifications were required from the Department before
HFA would provide financing for the project. The statute addresses
five major areas: compliance with all relevant provisions of the public
health law, conformity of the plans and specifications with code re-
quirements, sufficiency of revenues to meet expenses, availability of
funds to make the equity contribution, and the existence of a "regula-
84. Id. § 2878 provides not only that the Commissioner of Health may operate a hospital
when HFA has acquired the fee title, through foreclosure or otherwise, but also that the Commis-
sioner may, whenever there is any violation or anticipated violation of any requirement, proceed
against the hospital in the New York Supreme Court. In such an action, the court may appoint a
temporary or permanent receiver.
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tory agreement" between the hospital and the Commissioner8"
designed to provide the Commissioner with special controls over the
project during the operational period.86 This statutory mandate was
the basis for detailed reviews by the Department of proposed HFA
projects, including evaluation of the code conformance of the entire
project, determination of all forms of insurance coverage during and
after construction and analysis of funds required for the start-up
period. 7
In practice, the review process was quite fluid. Once the Commis-
sioner designated a project, HFA undertook its own independent re-
view of the two areas that concerned it most-financial feasibility and
the mortgagability of the property. Although the Commissioner had
completed a preliminary financial review, HFA required an additional,
detailed independent assessment by an outside consultant.8 8 In addi-
tion, HFA evaluated the title, title policy and easements to assure that
in the event of foreclosure there would be no controversy regarding the
priority of its lien and, therefore, that the facility would be able to pro-
vide services without disruption. When the mortgage was closed and
construction initiated, HFA and the Commissioner worked with the
hospital to complete the project on time and within the original cost
projection. These activities included monthly approvals of mortgage
drawdowns by both the Commissioner and HFA and approval of all
changes in plans and specifications by the Commissioner. 9
The Commissioner's dual levels of responsibility continued once
the project was operational. All HFA financed hospitals are subject to
the supervision the Commissioner exerts over every hospital in the
state. This includes rate control, surveys of compliance with physical
standards, inspections of the quality of care and certificate of need ap-
proval for construction or changes in services. The additional supervi-
85. Id. § 2875.
86. Id. § 2873, outlines the minimum provisions of the required "regulatory agreement": spe-
cifically, the hospital must agree to refrain from sale, assignment or transfer of the property during
the term of the mortgage; to obtain the consent of the Commissioner for modifications of the
physical plant, borrowing of any sort and management contracts; to maintain records in a speci-
fied manner, and to provide certain financial reports.
87. See Official Statement of New York State Housing Finance Agency, Hospital and Nurs-
ing Home Project Bonds, 1977 series A, at 27 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Official Statement].
88. In all cases, the financial feasibility of the project was reviewed by an independent
financial consultant. In some cases, the demand for the services to be provided by the project was
assessed by the consultant, in others by the Commissioner. Id. at 28.
89. Once construction was completed, the Department conducted an audit to set the final
mortgage amount and the allowable amount of capital reimbursement under Medicaid and Blue
Cross. See 10 N.Y. ADMIN. RULES & REGULATIONS § 87.32(a), (e) (1975).
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sion provided to HFA hospitals focuses on the financial soundness of
the operation and includes reviews of budgets and financial reports,
approval of all equipment leases, review and approval of all property
transactions such as the granting of easements, leases, and sales or
transfer of land, and approval of all withdrawals from the reserve for
replacement. 90 HFA also reviews many of these items and monitors
payment performance and financial reports to assure that the hospitals
can continue to meet their mortgage obligations.9'
The combination of these additional regulatory powers, the pool-
ing of a number of projects into one bond issue and the state's "moral
obligation" backing the bonds enabled HFA to finance a number of
projects that would, standing on their own, have had difficulty raising
capital or raising it at reasonable interest rates. These included start-up
hospitals with no established financial track record, hospitals located in
underserved, low-income areas, certain small rural hospitals and hospi-
tals with limited ability to generate substantial amounts of cash for eq-
uity. They would have encountered difficulties standing alone because,
as new hospitals, the rating agencies would not have been willing to
rate them92 or because the market would have perceived risks associ-
ated with the geographic location or financial situation of the projects.
Yet these projects were considered necessary, on a programmatic and
planning basis, by the Commissioner and financially feasible, with the
lower interest rates available through tax-exempt financing and low eq-
uity requirements, by an independent financial consultant.
From the inception of the hospital program in 1970 to 1974, HFA
entered into mortgage commitments of approximately $325 million for
the construction or renovation of twenty hospitals with approximately
seven thousand beds.93 The projects ranged from a small upstate com-
munity hospital, which had 40 hospital and 39 nursing home beds and
90. The controlling documents are N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2873, 2878(1.) (McKinney
1977); 10 N.Y. ADMIN. RULES & REGULATIONS § 87.36-.38 (1975); Standardized Form Mortgage'
of the New York State Housing Finance Agency, supra note 81. See also N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN.
LAW § 55.3 (McKinney 1976).
91. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2873(b), (c) (McKinney 1977).
92. For example, Standard & Poor's Corporation explicitly states:
We do not currently rate bond issues for nursing homes or life care centers although
these areas are being researched. . . . It is our policy not to rate start-up facilities, and,
similarly, we do not rate issues involving the relocation of a hospital unless a substantial
portion of its patients are derived from the area to which the hospital is moving.
STANDARD AND POOR'S CORP., MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL BOND RATINGS: AN OVER-
VIEW 38 (1977).
93. In addition, HFA provided mortgage commitments of almost $500 million to seventy-six
nursing homes. NEw YORK STATE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 26 (1978).
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required a mortgage of less than $1 million,94 to a master plan for a
Buffalo hospital. The latter called for an eight-year program of up-
grading and expanding the existing complex to 560 beds and construct-
ing a suburban inpatient satellite95 and involved a mortgage
commitment of $53 million.96
In 1973, there was concern within and outside the state govern-
ment that HFA would be unable to market the volume of hospital and
nursing home bonds needed to meet the state's health planning objec-
tives while continuing to market bonds for its other programs in an
orderly fashion. As a result, the Medical Care Facilities Finance
Agency (MCFFA) was created.97 It is a sister agency to HFA in that its
programmatic and financial structure are identical and in that it shares
HFA's Chairman, Executive Director and staff. In 1973 and 1974,
MCFFA entered into mortgage commitments of over $150 million for
five hospitals involving a total capacity of over 1700 beds.9" Its projects
included the $23 million renovation of a large upstate hospital99 and a
new 530 bed replacement hospital for a 200 bed community hospital in
Brooklyn. The latter involved the renovation of an abandoned factory
in a location separate from the original hospital and a mortgage of over
$60 million.'t 0
94. See Official Statement, supra note 87, at 56-62.
95. Seeid.
96. See NEW YORK STATE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, supra note 90, at 26.
97. MCFFA was created by the New York State Medical Care Facilities Finance Agency Act
of 1973, ch. 392, § 37, 1973 N.Y. Laws 1417 (codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 7411 (McKin-
ney 1979)). The legislative intent section clearly indicated that it was designed to increase market-
ing capacity:
In order to permit an acceleration in the implementation of these [hospital and nurs-
ing home financing] programs in areas where the public need remains urgent, without
jeopardizing the orderly marketing by the New York State Housing Finance Agency of
its notes and bonds for other program purposes, it is hereby found and declared that a
separate corporate governmental agency. . . be created as a single purpose agency to act
in concert with [HFA] and to devote its entire energy and resources to the provision of
additional funds for the construction of health and health related facilities. . . . In this
manner, the broadest possible base of investment by the greatest number of the general
public may be had and the initiative and strength of our private enterprise economy may
most readily be harnessed for the benefit of the people of the state.
Id.
98. Id. In addition, MCFFA provided mortgage commitments of approximately $50 million
to eight nursing homes. NEW YORK STATE MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES FINANCE AGENCY, AN-
NUAL REPORT 6 (1979).
99. Id.
100. PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO., SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS FROM





The Dormitory Authority first entered the arena of tax-exempt
hospital financing in the early 1970s.111 The structure of its hospital
financing program was not statutorily established. Therefore, the Dor-
mitory Authority used the financing framework of its other programs.
Because its enabling statute did not contain a general authorization to
finance hospitals, however, an express amendment was required for
each individual hospital it intended to finance. The Dormitory Author-
ity was empowered to finance its first hospital in the 1968 legislative
session 10 2 and made a commitment to finance the project in 1970.103
The Dormitory Authority's approach to tax-exempt hospital
financing was significantly different from that of HFA and MCFFA.
The bonds were backed only by the revenue of the individual project
and not by the "moral obligation" of the state, nor by a pool of
projects.' 04 Moreover, the Dormitory Authority was able to finance
discrete freestanding operations,' °5 such as parking garages and laun-
dries, and had no restriction on the amount of refinancing it could
undertake.
10 6
The Department's role in Dormitory Authority financing was
quite different as well. Indeed, the scope of the Department's reviews
did not extend beyond that for projects financed by private sources and
was based on its overall supervisory responsibilities for hospitals. The
Department did not specifically identify projects for the Dormitory Au-
thority to consider financing as it did for HFA and MCFFA, nor did it
continue to monitor projects during construction and operation. More-
101. Albany Medical Center Revenue Bonds, Series A ($22.560 million), discussed in DORMI-
TORY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ANNUAL REPORT: 1976-1977, at 28-29 (1977).
In the mid-1960s, the Dormitory Authority financed two nurses residences at hospitals totaling
under $2 million: Buffalo General Hospital Revenue Bonds ($1.175 million) and Geneva General
Hospital Revenue Bonds ($.465 million), described in id.
102. Act of June 22, 1968, ch. 1046, § 1, 1968 N.Y. Laws 2965 (codified at N.Y. PUB. AUTH.
LAW § 1676 (McKinney Supp. 1978)).
103. DORMITORY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 101, at 28-29. Dupli-
cation of functions among New York state authorities was not uncommon during this period.
Both HFA and the Dormitory Authority financed construction for the State University, and even
within HFA three separate programs provided hospital financing (Health Facilities, Hospitals and
Nursing Homes, and State University). MORELAND ACT COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 100.
104. See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1683 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
105. Id. § 1678.
106. Id. § 1682. Certain of the other characteristics of the Dormitory Authority (DA) hospital
financing program included: "The DA did not issue notes for hospital construction financing; and
in the early years of the program, the DA held fee title to the property and leased it to the hospital.
In the later years, it entered into a mortgage." DORMITORY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, supra note 101, at 28-30.
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over, the Dormitory Authority, unlike HFA and MCFFA, was both a
development and a financing authority. Thus, planning, design and
construction of the projects were directly supervised by the Dormitory
Authority staff. From 1970 to 1975, the Dormitory Authority financed
nine hospital projects in the state involving a total commitment of over
$115 million.
10 7
C. FHA 242 Insurance
During the time period in which HFA and MCFFA had made
commitments of almost $500 million to twenty-five hospitals, and the
Dormitory Authority over $100 million to nine hospitals, FHA 242 in-
surance had been issued for only two projects in New York-one in
1969 and one in 1975-with a total insured value of $12.2 million.10 8
This compared with a nationwide total of over 100 projects with an
insured value of over $1 billion.'0 9 New York hospitals had state
authority financing readily available at much lower interest rates and
longer terms than FHA 242 offered. As a result, they did not aggres-
sively pursue the federal insurance program."l0
III. THE FISCAL CRISIS AND THE STATE'S RESPONSE
In 1975, the market for New York state and state-related securities
began to disintegrate in response to a number of factors, including the
temporary default of the New York State Urban Development Corpo-
ration (UDC) on short-term notes,"' the financial problems of New
York City and general market concern with the rapid escalation of
financing by the state and its authorities and municipalities. As one
member of the underwriting community later commented, "by late
1975, the market for State and Agency paper 'closed down' as we eu-
phemistically put it. Collapsed better describes the event."1 2 The en-
107. See DORMITORY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK, supra note 101, at 28-31.
108. See ICF INC., supra note 12, at 68 (Table B-3).
109. Id.
110. Id. The consideration given to FHA 242 insurance in New York was aptly stated in a
1973 publication of the New York Hospital Association in which a comment on the increasing
attention focused on the FHA 242 program by hospital administrators was footnoted to make it
clear that this was only in states other than New York. A. GLAUDE, AN ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE
28-B, DORMITORY AUTHORITY AND HILL BURTON GUARANTEED LOAN INTEREST SUBSIDY CAPI-
TAL FINANCING PROGRAMS FOR HOSPITALS IN NEW YORK STATE 54 (1973).
Ill. UDC defaulted on $104.5 million in notes on February 25, 1975; this default was subse-
quently cured. MORELAND ACT COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 201-03.
112. Rousseau, Project Financing Suggested as Vehiclefor Hospital Bonds, THE DAILY BOND
BUYER, January 31, 1978, at 3, 18.
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suing fiscal crisis and the response to it significantly affected the
existing hospital financing programs and provide the context for deci-
sions about future hospital financings in New York.
At the time the market closed, HFA and MCFFA had unbonded
outstanding commitments of approximately $2.0 billion of which ap-
proximately $400 million were for hospital and nursing home
projects."l 3 The implications of these figures must be viewed in the
context of HFA's and MCFFA's procedures for obtaining construction
and development funds for projects. During the initial stages of a pro-
ject, HFA and MCFFA sold short-term obligations-one year or less
bond anticipation notes. Initially, the funds were invested and, as the
project progressed, advanced to pay construction and other costs. As
the notes matured, HFA and MCFFA issued new short-term notes to
repay the outstanding ones. When a number of projects reached a rea-
sonable degree of completion, long-term bonds were issued to repay the
notes, thus replacing a short-term security with a long-term security. 1
4
An important distinction between these bonds and notes is that while
the bonds are explicitly backed by the "moral obligation" of the state,
the notes are not.
Notes rather than bonds were used to provide funds during the
development period for a number of reasons. Under normal market
conditions, the interest rates on notes are lower than those on bonds
because there is less risk associated with a shorter term.l l' Therefore,
using notes resulted in lower overall project costs because it resulted in
lower capitalized interest costs during the development period. Al-
though bonds for a project might be sold one or more times during the
development period, the final bond sale did not occur until construc-
tion was completed, the project was operational, and a reasonably ac-
curate estimate of total project cost and, therefore, of total bonds
required could be obtained.
This approach to construction financing required ready access to
the financial market to sell notes or bonds at least annually to repay
outstanding notes and to provide additional financing for outstanding
or new commitments. Unfortunately, when UDC defaulted on its out-
113. HFA had approximately $235 million and MCFFA had approximately $145 million.
Preliminary Official Statement, State of New York 1979 Tax and Revenue Anticipation Notes 36
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Official Statement].
114. Bonds are limited by statute to a maximum term of 50 years. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN.
LAW § 46(2)(a) (McKinney 1976). In practice, however, they are generally limited to 40 years.
115. HARRIS TRUST & SAVINGS BANK, PRIMER ON RELATIVE YIELD CURVE VALUES 15-19
(1977).
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standing notes in February 1975, this ready access disappeared. The
immediate financial impact of the UDC default on HFA was summa-
rized by one commentator in May 1975:
It is beyond question that the corporation's default on its notes
has meant that other agencies have had to pay substantially higher
interest rates than otherwise would be required. And if this turns out
to be more than a passing phenomenon, the costs could be enormous.
The New York State Housing Finance Agency's cost of borrow-
ing has showed a marked increase since the UDC default. In Febru-
ary, before the default, HFA issued short-term bond anticipation
notes for an average interest rate of 4.3 per cent. In March, the
agency was able to sell only $53 million of $95 million in notes of-
fered, and at an average interest rate of 7.4 per cent, more than 3
points above the February rate. In April, with the UDC notes still in
default, the agency's notes were sold at about 8.3 per cent. The rate
dropped slightly in May,. . . to about 7.6 per cent. During the same
period, short-term notes carrying the full faith and credit of the state
sold for rates more than two points lower. In recent times, the spread
between the state's notes and HFA's notes has fluctuated between
one point and one half a point, and HFA attributes the growth of the
spread directly to the UDC debacle.
Long-term bonds issued also have been adversely affected. On
April 23, the New York State Medical Care Facilities Finance
Agency, which is operated by HFA, was able to sell only $62 million
of $82 million offered in long-term bonds and at an interest rate of
9.6 per cent, the highest yet paid by a state agency."1
6
The situation deteriorated from May to October when HFA and
MCFFA were entirely barred from borrowing in the public capital
marketplace. At the beginning of 1975 HFA and MCFFA had already
placed a voluntary moratorium on entering into any new commit-
ments; 7 by the end of the year they were scrambling to meet existing
commitments.
In December 1975, HFA, MCFFA and two other independent au-
thorities that had encountered similar marketing difficulties'--diffi-
culties that were precipitated by events external to these authorities-
joined with state officials to develop a plan for meeting temporary
116. Clark, UDC Crisis.- Future Fallout on N. Y Bonds?, I EMPIRE STATE REP. 193 (1975).
117. New York State Housing Finance Agency Memorandum from P. Belica, Executive Di-
rector, to the Agency members (March 13, 1975) (copy on file in the office of the North Carolina
Law Review).
118. The other two authorities with outstanding indebtedness were the Dormitory Authority
and the Environmental Facilities Corporation (EFC); they had respective outstanding commit-
ments of $300 million and $30 million (none of it attributable to hospital projects). Preliminary
Official Statement, supra note 113, at 36.
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financing requirements." '9 The purpose of this plan, which was put in
place in March 1976, was to enable the four authorities to complete all
significant projects in progress without defaulting on notes while grad-
ually reentering the market and selling bonds in an orderly fashion. In
setting the stage for such a plan, the state took a number of unprece-
dented steps designed to allay investor concerns and to signal the state's
commitment to sound fiscal policies and financial management.
First, the state put its own financial resources on the line for the
first time: it directly appropriated funds to pay certain obligations and
set up a special contingency fund. 2 ° Second, the state placed a statu-
tory limit on all "moral obligation" financing by all state authorities.''
As a result, all future commitments for new projects had to be financed
on a revenue bond basis without extending the "moral obligation" of
the state. Finally, the Public Authorities Control Board was statutorily
established as an oversight mechanism to supervise borrowing activi-
ties. Its mandate was to review and approve proposals by the four au-
thorities to incur new debt or acquire/construct new projects whether
or not the projects involved the "moral obligation" of the state.'22
Once the plan for temporary financing was in place, the first prior-
ity of the four authorities was to find permanent sources of financing
119. The plan to provide interim financing, which became known as the "Build Out Plan,"
originally extended through September 30, 1978 and was subsequently extended to September 30,
1980. The "Build Out Plan" was a complex and sometimes convoluted plan to provide temporary
financing for projects that had commitments from the four authorities. This plan enlisted numer-
ous sources of financing, some of which had not previously invested in tax-exempt obligations,
including but not limited to, state or state-related entities such as the Teacher's Retirement Sys-
tem, banks and insurance companies. The debt was placed in accordance with a carefully orches-
trated plan, and the commitment of funds by one source was often contingent on participation by
another source. Certain projects were suspended as part of the "Build Out Plan." Id. at 34-37.
The complexity of the financial transactions in the period prior to the "Build Out Plan" is illus-
trated in Greenhouse, A Complex Shift of Funds Saves State Finance Unit, THE NEW YORK TiMEs,
October 10, 1975, at 1, col. 6. An elaborate plan had already been developed to rescue the New
York State Urban Development Corporation.
120. The commitment of state funds included, but was not limited to, an appropriation of $36
million to HFA and EFC to enable them to pay certain of their notes, a direct appropriation of
$10.1 million, pursuant to the "moral obligation" provision, to replenish the HFA Non-Profit
Housing Debt Service Reserve Fund, and a stand-by appropriation of $80 million in the event
that an alternate source of repayment of maturing notes was not available for HFA. Official
Statement, $45,000,000 State of New York Serial Bonds (Pure Waters) 37 (1976).
121. Act of March 15, 1976, ch. 38, §§ 22-23, 1976 N.Y. Laws I (codified at N.Y. PRIv. Hous.
FIN. LAW § 47(5)(c) (McKinney 1976)). The cap was set at a level sufficient to enable the authori-
ties to complete all projects for which commitments had been made (including deposits to the
Debt Service Reserve Fund) with a small reserve for contingencies. HFA's and MCFFA's hospi-
tal and nursing home "moral obligation" financings were capped at $1.156 billion out of a total
authorization of $3.950 billion. Id.
122. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 50 (McKinney Supp. 1978). The Public Authorities Control
Board was also empowered to review and approve proposals by certain other authorities to incur
additional "moral obligation" debt. Id.
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for their projects.'23 HFA's first public sale of Hospital and Nursing
Home Program bonds was in October 1977 for approximately $236
million at 6.99 percent. 12 4 In addition to the revenues of the projects, a
one year debt service reserve fund and the "moral obligation" of the
state, these bonds were backed by a new $12 million state appropria-
tion for a special reserve fund available to the bondholders, in the event
a project is unable to pay its debt service, prior to the debt service re-
serve fund or the state's "moral obligation."'' 25 This level of security
was added to attract investors and to assure them of the state's commit-
ment to its authorities.
Through this period, it became evident that the investment com-
munity closely identified the state with its authorities and municipali-
ties because they accounted for a substantial portion of the outstanding
state and state-related debt. As a result, the financial stability of the
state itself was closely tied to that of its authorities. 126 Indeed, the
financial difficulties of the authorities had major ramifications for the
state's own ability to enter the financial marketplace and for the inter-
est rate it had to pay. Specifically, the state annually borrows over $3.5
billion on a short-term basis. In 1975, it was all sold publicly at an
interest rate of 5.26 percent; 127 in 1976, only approximately $2.75 bil-
lion was sold publicly at an interest rate of 7 percent. 28 Clearly, the
state had to supervise the financing activities of its authorities if it was
to maintain its own financial viability.
The response of the state and its authorities to the fiscal crisis in
New York explains the hiatus in new hospital commitments from 1975
123. By April 1979, the outstanding permanent financing needs of the four authorities-HFA,
MCFFA, Dormitory Authority, and EFC-were reduced from $2.6 billion to less than $1.0 bil-
lion. Preliminary Official Statement, supra note 113, at 36. This was accomplished by the public
sale of bonds, the sale of individual projects on a revenue bond basis (with or without federal
insurance in the case of housing projects), the substitution of private financing, and the permanent
suspension of projects. For a discussion of the reentry of New York state and its authorities into
the market, see FIRST ALBANY CORP., MUNICIPAL RESEARCH REPORT, NEW YORK STATE: AN
EXAMINATION OF AN IMPROVING CREDIT (1977).
124. Official Statement, $236,445,000, New York State Housing Finance Agency Hospital and
Nursing Home Project Bonds, 1977 Series A (October 6, 1977). The first issue for any program
was in September 1976. Official Statement, $149,065,000 New York State Housing Finance
Agency, 9% State University Construction Bonds, 1976 Series B (September 16, 1976).
125. Official Statement, $236,445,000, New York State Housing Finance Agency Hospital and
Nursing Home Project Bonds, supra note 124, at 4, 38-39.
126. Official Statement, $45,000,000 State of New York Serial Bonds (Pure Waters), supra
note 120, at 35.
127. New York State Dep't of Audit and Control, Internal Memorandum (undated) (copy on
file in office of the North Carolina Law Review).
128. Official Statement, $2,750,000,000, State of New York, 7% Tax and Revenue Anticipation
Notes (April 15, 1976).
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to 1978, illustrates the ongoing interrelationships between tax-exempt
financing for hospitals and for other purposes in the state, and provides
the framework for decisions about future hospital financings. The tax-
exempt financing programs had successfully encouraged the construc-
tion, renovation and modernization of hospitals in the state and pro-
vided loans with significantly lower interest rates than would have
otherwise been available. HFA, MCFFA and the Dormitory Authority
had never (nor have they since) defaulted on a hospital or nursing
home bond or note. Nevertheless, the initiation of new projects was
entirely cut off for three years. As a representative of a major invest-
ment firm commented when discussing the future of hospital financing
in New York:
[T]he effect that we learned, or should have, in 1975 and 1976, was
that confidence is more or less indivisible within a state. To the ex-
tent that the state or any of its instrumentalities is perceived to be in
trouble, all of them will suffer in the marketplace to some degree...
as the Bible observes, the rain falls on the just and the unjust alike.'
29
The moratorium on state authority hospital financing resulted in a
dramatic shift toward the use of the FHA 242 insurance program in the
state. As noted above, prior to 1976, only two New York hospitals re-
ceived insurance valued at $12 million. 130 Then, in 1976 alone, how-
ever, twelve hospitals received insurance valued at $290 million. This
was almost half of the insurance issued nationwide in 1976, and it ex-
ceeded the nationwide dollar value in any preceding year. 131 This shift
away from tax-exempt financing resulted in interest costs that were
higher than might have been expected with tax-exempt bond financing
and, therefore, in higher reimbursements rates paid by third-party
payors and consumers of health care.
The upsurge of FHA 242 financing in the state did not, however,
fully meet the needs of hospitals in New York. 32 Many turned to com-
mercial lenders and others deferred construction until they could ob-
tain a financing source. In 1978, the state, responding to the needs of
the hospitals, began to consider reactivating its tax-exempt hospital
financing program. 3 3 The concerns of the state health care officials
129. Rousseau, supra note 112, at 18.
130. ICF INC., supra note 12, at 68 (Table B-3).
131. Id.
132. For an assessment of the relative merits of various methods from the hospital's perspec-
tive, see AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, CAPITAL FINANCING FOR HOSPITALS 37-49 (1978).
133. During 1978, the Dormitory Authority accomplished two financings by combining the
FHA 242 insurance, Government National Mortgage Association participation and tax exemption
at a total value of approximately $46 million. As explained above, this mechanism poses no
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were summarized in a letter to HFA in August 1978:
[I]nsofar as the HFA and MCFFA program is concerned, I believe
that it is both wise and necessary that we initiate new mortgage
loans. While there is generally an oversupply of acute care beds in
the State as a whole, many needed hospitals are operating in noncon-
forming structures which must be renovated if they are to meet safe
structural standards and are to be available for future use. It would
appear that the [HFA and MCFFA] program could serve as a vehicle
to finance necessary renovations, at a relatively low cost, and where
the opportunity avails itself, realign bed capacity of the institutions
with projected long-range requirements.'
34
These concerns regarding the health care system were, necessarily,
weighed against the lessons of the fiscal crisis and the concerns of the
financing authorities and the Public Authorities Control Board about
further direct or indirect extension of the state's credit. Financing pri-
orities must be set, and the decisions regarding financing hospitals must
be made relative to other equally worthy projects. Potential competi-
tors include State University construction, a convention center for New
York City, economic development projects and housing.
The state, nonetheless, has decided to pursue additional hospital
financing on a limited basis. The Public Authorities Control Board
adopted a general framework for financing by HFA, MCFFA and the
Dormitory Authority. 35 The authorities are required to cooperate
closely with the Department in project selection and evaluation in an
attempt to assure that projects receiving financing are consistent with
the state's health planning objectives. HFA and MCFFA had histori-
cally used this approach; the Dormitory Authority, however, must ad-
just its procedures. Hospitals are also required to provide significant
equity-ten percent of development costs-to demonstrate their com-
mitment to the project and financial capacity to generate such funds.
Finally, capital construction projects must pass a stringent review of
financial feasibility. Hospitals will be required to demonstrate that
financial risk to the state or the Authority. See note 46 and accompanying text supra. In addition,
the Dormitory Authority completed one refinancing for a project that had been in the midst of
processing in 1975 when the market collapsed. Private Placement Memorandum, Dormitory Au-
thority of the State of New York, Revenue Bonds, Charles S. Wilson Memorial Hospital Issue,
Series A (Sept. 27, 1978).
134. Letter from Richard Berman, Director, Office of Health Systems Management, State of
New York Dep't of Health, to Robert Vagt, Executive Director, New York State Housing Finance
Agency (Aug. 15, 1978) (copy on file in the office of the North Carolina Law Reriew).
135. Instructions to Staff regarding the Review of Health Care Financing Applications (reso-
lution included in the minutes of the May 16, 1979 Public Authorities Control Board meeting)




they are needed, not only on the basis of statewide or local planning
standards, but also on the basis of the actual demand for the institution
by physicians and patients within their service area. In addition, hospi-
tals must demonstrate that they have sufficient economic resources and
managerial skills to operate on a financially sound basis.' 36
The specific details of HFA's and MCFFA's financing program
have been modified to reflect the statutory and programmatic changes
emanating from the fiscal crisis. Specifically, the bonds can be backed
only by the revenue of the project, not the "moral obligation" of the
state. Therefore, as a practical corollary, the bonds can only be issued
for an individual project rather than a pool of projects. In addition, no
notes will be issued for construction financing. 137 The Dormitory Au-
thority did not need to modify its financing approach, which histori-
cally involved individual project revenue bonds.
New York authorities are now able to undertake financing for cer-
tain projects on a limited basis but are not in a position to assist less
secure projects through the "moral obligation" provision as they have
in the past. There is a need for a supplemental federal program, per-
haps a targeting of the FHA 242 program or a direct grant program, to
assure that projects that provide needed hospital services to communi-
ties in the state are able to obtain the financing needed in order to con-
tinue operating, maintaining their physical plants and providing high
quality medical care.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This review of capital financing for hospitals provides insights into
the interrelationship between hospital capital financing programs and
the federal and state governments' long-range health goals of assuring
access to care for all citizens, maintaining a high standard for quality of
care and bringing the rapid escalation of health care costs under con-
trol. Moreover, the New York State experience demonstrates how, at
the state and local level, hospital financing interlocks with the financing
of other public purpose projects. This review provides a framework for
136. Conditions for New York State Housing Finance Agency, New York State Medical Care
Facilities Finance Agency, Hospital Renovation Projects, Noninsured Project Revenue Bonds,
and New York State Housing Finance Agency, New York State Medical Care Facilities Finance
Agency Financial Feasibility Study Guidelines, adopted by the Members of the New York State
Housing Finance Agency on February 23, 1979.
137. Instructions to Staff, supra note 135, at 1. The concern with note financing is reflected in
the requirement that HFA and MCFFA refrain from entering into any new commitments until
substantially all their notes are converted into bonds.
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assessing existing capital financing programs and evaluating new pro-
posals to assure that their objectives are realistic, their anticipated out-
comes are consistent with stated goals and their expectations for
participation at the state and local level are appropriate.
Both state and federal governments agree on the three overall
goals stated above, with the federal and some state governments plac-
ing particularly high priority, at the present time, on controlling health
care costs.' 38 Yet there is little consensus on the specific steps required
to achieve these goals. Capital financing for the construction of new
hospitals and maintenance of existing ones has implications for all
three health policy goals. Capital funds are needed for the construction
of new facilities and the renovation of existing ones to improve access
to care in underserved areas. Furthermore, to assure that the care they
provide is of high quality, hospitals in all areas must maintain their
physical plants and periodically upgrade their equipment to reflect
technological advances. Finally, capital expenditures affect the cost of
health care directly through interest, amortization and other construc-
tion related costs. Indeed, the potential for reducing interest costs is the
most commonly cited reason for government intervention in hospital
capital financing. Moreover, capital expenditures can have an indirect
effect through associated changes in hospital operating costs. For ex-
ample, the construction of a new service such as a neo-natal unit would
result in an increase in the intensity and sophistication of the services
provided and a concomitant adjustment in equipment, supplies and
staffing. Even when a service such as a surgical suite is merely re-
placed, there is often upgrading, with related increases in operating ex-
penses. Conversely, construction changes may, in some situations,
cause a net reduction in costs through increased efficiency.
Most efforts at controlling capital expenditures have relied on the
health planning process to weigh the potential advantages and limita-
tions of particular proposals and to control the number and scope of
approved projects.'39 This might be sufficient if such programs were
themselves well thought out and effective. Unfortunately, in many
cases they are not. 140 Furthermore, the method of financing proposed
projects has generally been overlooked by planning programs, and the
potential power of government financing programs in reinforcing
health planning objectives has not been adequately explored. This is
138. See generally Wing & Silton, this Symposium.
139. See general Wing & Craige, this Symposium.
140. See generally Schonbrun, this Symposium.
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indicative of the fragmentation and lack of coordination in virtually all
health regulatory activities today.
Orchestrating a coordinated effort may be difficult because the
government participants themselves have different orientations and are
responsive to different constituencies. State health planning officials
must respond not only to their professional concerns regarding health
needs, but also to the interest of local health planning groups, state-
wide health planning advisory councils, individual hospitals and, in
some cases, the state legislature, governor and other political forces.
State financing authorities usually report to independent boards, are
concerned primarily with protecting the interests of existing bondhold-
ers and often interact more frequently with members of the financial
community than with health planning officials. HEW officials are re-
sponsible to their own regional administration and the central adminis-
tration in Washington, and this may lead to conflicts with the objectives
of local and state planners.
Nonetheless, government financing has significant potential as a
mechanism to reinforce planning objectives and to coordinate various
government efforts. In New York, for example, many areas of the state
have excess hospital bed capacity, and the state health planning policy
emphasizes mergers and consolidations. Government financing could
be made available on a priority basis to assist and encourage such pro-
posals. In addition, hospitals in underserved, low-income areas, which
have been unable to generate extra reserves because they have incurred
ambulatory care deficits and bad debts of significant size, and new or
relocated hospitals, which have no financial track record, have diffi-
culty obtaining financing from nongovernmental sources, despite their
importance to the provision of health care. Government financing can
assist such institutions in two ways: relatively low requirements for eq-
uity contributions enable hospitals to qualify even though they have
limited capacity to generate cash contributions, and lower interest costs
make demonstration of financial feasibility less difficult. In cases in
which tax-exempt revenue bonds are still not marketable, FHA 242 in-
surance could be used. If even this option is not viable, direct subsidies
may be necessary.
Government financing can also be used to discourage or modify
projects that are, on detailed review, not feasible or that slip through
the certificate of need process. This can be accomplished because
financing provides a tool for additional screening and for controlling
the construction program. Certificate of need provides a preliminary
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screen of the need within the community for the proposed project. Fi-
nancing, however, usually brings with it more careful scrutiny, such as
an in-depth evaluation of the demand for services and of projected
financial performance by an independent financial feasibility
consultant.
On the other hand, there are certain potential drawbacks to
government financing. At a time of acknowledged excess capacity in
many areas of the country, including significant portions of New York,
the ready availability of government financing may tend to encourage
unnecessary expansion. Expansion will be particularly likely when
hospital financing is not carefully aligned with health planning activi-
ties or when health planning requirements are not sufficiently articu-
lated or enforced, and somewhat lower priority, but politically
powerful projects are likely to be approved.
To the extent that government financing encourages excess con-
struction, the savings on individual projects resulting from lower inter-
est rates may be more than offset by the costs of unnecessary
construction as well as any associated increases in operating costs. Un-
necessary construction can take two forms--entire projects that would
not otherwise have been built, and increments of projects permitted ei-
ther by the more easily met governmental financing requirements or by
ineffective review of the need for or cost effectiveness of the increments
by government officials. Indeed, it could be argued that government
financing removes projects from the scrutiny of the private capital mar-
ket where financial feasibility must be clearly demonstrated and places
it in a more political arena.
Rather than assist projects that would not otherwise be con-
structed, government financing may merely substitute for commercial
mortgages issued in the private market. In fact, the financings accom-
plished through government to date have not been targeted to projects
that could not receive financing without such assistance. HEW has not
based its processing of FHA 242 applications on local health planning
priorities, and state authorities have directed their programs to the hos-
pitals that are financially secure. As a result, certain projects may have
no available source of financing.
The federal or state government assumes a risk by extending its
credit, either directly or indirectly. For the federal government, a de-
fault may not affect marketing of other issues. For a state, however, the
ramifications can be severe. A default on a single hospital project
would have limited effect, but a series of defaults could have negative
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repercussions in the market for other issues of the authority or, if the
situation became sufficiently severe, as the New York experience
demonstrated, for the state itself. Furthermore, as a corollary, govern-
ment financing may come into conflict with future cost containment
efforts if such efforts would jeopardize the financial feasibility of a state
authority financed or a federally insured project. There would, un-
questionably, be reluctance to undertaking a cost containment strategy
that would precipitate a default.
The federal and state governments should reassess the role of their
hospital capital financing programs as they pursue their long-term
health care goals of access, quality and cost containment. The preced-
ing discussion demonstrates that states should be aware of the potential
risks, as well as the immediate advantages of tax-exempt financing.
The federal government should consider focusing its efforts on hospi-
tals that provide necessary care but pose a greater financial risk than
the private market is willing to accept, and the states are able to absorb.
Together, the state and federal governments should consider a closer
coordination among planning programs, financing programs and other
related activities to ensure that both state and federal financing pro-
grams achieve the objectives for which they are designed.
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